

missile in 198? or 2006?

on Dec. 1998

question: How EU does

Defending NATO's strategic doctrine of EU  
- the most irresponsible, reckless, criminal/evil  
policy in the history of the human species  
- on grounds that it keeps "an aggressor" from  
"being certain as to NATO's response"

(the Modern Strategy)

(Cruel - it would question the certainty  
of <sup>EU</sup> US threats everywhere, i.e. elsewhere -  
IRAQ (1990-91) IRAN, LIBYA

i.e. by rejecting legitimacy of EU threats  
somewhere - by NATO in Europe - it would question  
legitimacy of US threats elsewhere

1991 threat

(Hug) "commit NATO strat. concept"

"makes the risks of <sup>any</sup> aggression

inevitably and inescapably and unacceptable"

by denying any potential aggressor any certainty about the nature of the  
Allies' (US) response to military aggression."

(The NATO case was the case for

EU - 175 SU divisions -

like Hiroshima - nuclear, 14 countries

or MP-I: Hitler

Anal. of other threats - not justified in themselves -  
piggies - backed on there - if this, maybe that - wof not?  
We've got to have the weapons, anyway...

If you're mad - so as to make that threat credible -  
you're mad: you ought use it for known threats...

Cohn,  
Albright,  
vs. Joshua  
Fischer



12-19-66

Henry: for NATO to cling to EU — leading  
to take any move toward Ant VI, divers —  
discourages other nations from observing NAT  
or joining

US (?): "We think giving up EU threats  
encourages prolif (Wf? "encourages aggression?  
how, prolif?)":

12-13-66 My "threat" — to break out of NATO if  
US arms move on from

could be used to increase chances  
of a Human bond (not other: i.e.  
rather than one EU alliance, several  
new Type I Det / min det (?) forces.  
What is worse?

or which is worse note:

— US EU use us. from

— Human possession of arms ?



12-19-06

FU

Are there <sup>any</sup> limits (X) to the prospects of what is acceptable to do to achieve a success — or avert a failure — "before the event, before the conflict is engaged, before any have died or been killed

But this is much lower than the amount ( $Y > X$ ) one will accept after conflict is underway and public, lives have been lost, sunk costs — or, the prospect of further lives lost, costs, one will pay ( $Z > X$ ) lengths to avert failure, redeem / vindicate past costs

A problem that lowers deterrence / inhibition is that X is uncertain (as is Z); also, events, internally controversial...

Are there limits to what you may do in pursuit of victory, or to avert defeat, in warlike?

(War crimes: dikes, cities, poisoning wells, cutting fruit trees)

TCS  
commitment

What are limits in threatening such things? (Risky?) Preparing? Acting to make threats credible? Demos; destroying attractions; delegating / automating; widely misrepresenting costs & benefits to leaders, constituencies... (proving genocide; cockroaches; terrorists...)

What if Holocaust had been threatened, to achieve various political ends? Would that count it to a war crime? (What if Albin threatened — in past Case?)

Then = S.B.? What if SB were "sniff" coming at a threat?



X  
12-19-06

Does threatening ~~them~~ do X legitimize X  
"under some circumstances"?

vs. "banning" it, criminalizing it?

(Neither Holocaust nor S.B. were used  
coercively!

except, S.B. was to coerce leaders —  
to surrender — if they could shut the people!  
(in MCH to Hawaii leaving, in QT)

As an instrument of coercion  
(e.g. "Stop S.B.") would the  
Holocaust have been less legitimate than  
S.B.?

(No more effective than S.B.)  
Tokyo leaders didn't come about civil killing;  
Allied leaders " " " ~~then, Japanese killed~~  
nor did Allied leaders ~~then~~  
come about Korean, Japanese civil.  
NO ONE CARED

Unthinkably/  
Unsayable:

(em, about John Catho in Nagasaki)

"US might not come at FU vs. SO"

"Having might  
became NATO

[ R.

"NATO seemed give  
up FU"

In 1998 Jaschka Frick "violated a long-standing  
taboo" in NATO — against even discussing or considering

the  
unthinkable  
allies/3rd rail  
of NATO being:

the ~~re~~ repudiation of threats and troops for  
mere FU — i.e. in NATO context, threats and  
troops for omni-general

this is a region where discussion that  
denies the reality or scale of the Holocaust  
is criminal

Reservations on freedom of speech —  
denying historical general  
opposing future (we) general:



12-19-06

Book

delusions  
legitimizing  
EU

[RECALL my Dec. 1963? NATO speech for  
MEN - me David... PEMA boundary

175 divs...

Berlin?  
NATO  
Is.  
Pak-  
Iraq/Iran

1996 ICJ opinion - "if (territorial) <sup>expansion, survival</sup> rights  
were threatened... EU could be... (Israel?)  
not true in 1945, Hussein!

2d war -  
no limits?!  
in ICJ opinion

not true for NATO in 1996 (or since 1989)

not true in Gulf War (1991)

or Iraq (2003)

Hypothetically: Israel!

Pakistan!

Why not Iraq or Iran, facing devastating  
non-nuclear attack?



12-19-06

see 1998-89  
discussions

NATO policy <sup>of threatening EU</sup> is described as "ambiguity"  
= Soviet's possession of nukes  
it is as ambiguous, really, as Soviet's: i.e. not ambiguous.  
NATO promises & is fully ready to respond  
with EU!

Not just, "might..."

"Reserves the option..."

On the excuse of deterring attack  
on Berlin or West Germany, the US built  
a Doolittle Machine for the Northern Hemisphere  
(as of 1965-65; earlier, for N.H. minus North America).  
Incidentally, it might have been global,  
from 1958 on.

After the global risk was discarded, 1983,  
plans didn't change.

After danger to Europe + need for deterrence — disappeared  
(1989/91) — 15 years ago, 23 years after we built —  
the Machine remains in place, on a hair-trigger  
(Khrushchev + Eisenhower proposal taking  
it off "alert" (+EU) in 1948 — 8 years ago...

The major risk of initiating war was  
less always — each year since 1945 —  
came from the <sup>one</sup> country that has carried out more  
attacks, one of the 2 that have destroyed  
whole cities from the air (or 3 (4) that have  
attacked cities.



chap 3  
Herson

## Propaganda

"We will bury you" K

Used by US, like Ambassador, "eliminate  
the joint state" (like the SU" |

K was like S4, bluffing about nuclear  
cap.

(analysts, pols, scholars, officials  
US) tending to assume USG threats either  
did not occur at all, or were conscious bluff  
\* (no warships, no ships - "no real commitment")  
"after all, none carried out." <sup>realization</sup>

like looking:  
there can't have been  
a conspiracy - the next  
conclusion is hoped  
the day by no way

like Bush saying in 2004 on his way on  
terror his effort - "no attacks on US since 9-11-01"

(Katharine - had there been false claims before?  
and SF earthquakes: "no big one (since 89)

see reaction to Dulles' Brinkmanship article

\* false Hiroshima history → false lesson:

"to lose fear of 100 US KIA  
to get Pres to authorize..."

(7 hours after Oct 45 - or, 7 more?)

(If wasn't confident the real reasons  
would be accepted as justifying.

In 2005, McN still his about "military targets,  
collateral damage" (despite being opposed  
to an awareness of Tokyo + 67 cities.

Both CC + Chins agreed, "China is one" (Taiwan)

like SVN + NVN: "VN is one" (Hanoi?)

US falls back to 2 states. US + SU: Hanoi is  
Two.